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 User damages and the limits 
of compensatory reasoning 
 Alvin W-L See * 
 The use of the term “user damages” in reference to compensatory damages is 
particularly problematic because it tends to overgeneralise the cases and conceal 
the importance of identifying the relevant loss in each case, which has implications 
on issues of proof, quantifi cation and mitigation. This has contributed to the 
persistent neglect squarely to address issues of loss, which has in turn led to both 
over- and underestimation of the limits of compensatory damages. Once we look 
past the broad label, it becomes obvious that the cases purportedly unifi ed by a 
common measure of loss tend to vary widely in facts and that the employment of 
the same measure was often merely coincidental. If the broad label adds nothing 
but distraction and confusion, it may be time to consider dropping it from our 
legal vocabulary. 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
 A owns a car and B, without permission, takes it for a joyride around the country.  1  A week 
later, B returns the car after a thorough service and with a full tank of petrol. The car is 
in a better condition than it was before; it did not depreciate in value. Yet, it is generally 
accepted that A would be entitled to claim from B a reasonable sum for the use of the 
car.  2  Damages assessed on this basis are often referred to as “user damages”.  3  The term 
hints at a restitutionary remedy, as it appears to focus on B’s use of A’s property. This 
view fi nds considerable support from the existing academic literature, which has mostly 
focused on explaining user damages on the basis of restitutionary principles. Certainly, 
approaching the topic in this manner has its benefi ts, particularly when confronted with 
situations where A’s loss is not readily identifi able. However, it is not the intention of 
this article to engage with the well-trodden discussion on the justifi cation and limits of 
restitutionary damages. Instead, it seeks to examine the extent to which user damages 
are explicable by reference to compensatory principles, a topic that has received far 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Singapore Management University. I would like to thank my colleagues, Tham 
Chee Ho, Man Yip, Yeo Tiong Min, Kelvin Low, David Llewelyn, Gary Chan and Goh Yihan for their helpful 
comments. All errors are my own.
 1 .  For consistency, I shall refer to “A” as the party whose right has been infringed and “B” as the party who 
has infringed A’s right. 
 2 .  For famous dicta to this effect, see  The Mediana [1900] AC 113 (HL), 117 (Earl of Halsbury LC);  Watson, 
Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 (HL), 119 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). 
 3 .  This was derived from the term “user principle” coined by Nicholls LJ in  Stoke-on-Trent City Council v 
W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 (CA), 1416. 
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less attention. This inquiry, it must be stressed, is not without practical signifi cance. 
Although in most cases of this kind either a compensatory or a restitutionary analysis 
would work equally well in A’s favour, and A may fi nd it convenient to rely solely on 
restitutionary principles owing to their straightforward application, in a rare case A may 
be compelled to fall back and pursue a claim for compensation. A good example is 
where A’s restitutionary claim is impeded because B successfully invokes a subjective 
devaluation argument  4  or a change of position defence.  5  In such a case, the precise limits 
of compensatory principles take centre stage, and the underestimation of the reach of 
compensatory damages puts A at a disadvantage. 
 On the fl ip side, it shall be observed that existing attempts at explaining user damages 
on the basis of compensatory principles tend to overstate their limits. It is often assumed 
that all the cases on this topic can, and should, be explained on a common basis. 
However, once we look past broad labels,  6  it becomes obvious that many of the cases 
purportedly unifi ed by a common measure of loss vary widely in facts, and that often the 
employment of the same measure was not dictated by principle but merely coincidental. 
Properly considered, these cases reveal important differences that have implications 
on issues of proof, quantifi cation and mitigation. To substantiate this point, this article 
revisits a number of important cases which collectively lay down one basic principle 
of compensation: A must identify a relevant loss and prove it. This is best illustrated in 
cases concerning wrongful interference with chattels, as in the earlier example, where the 
question of loss can be answered only by inquiring into the purpose for which A owns the 
property. This approach provides a useful framework for evaluating a number of diffi cult 
cases concerning infringement of real property rights and breach of contract. 
 In the following discussion, I will place particular emphasis on cases in which the monetary 
award is explicitly justifi ed on the basis of compensation for loss. This would allow the issue 
of loss to be clearly addressed without being distracted by restitutionary arguments. To be 
sure, this article does not state a preference for either analysis but is receptive to the idea 
that both analyses have a role to play in explaining user damages. In choosing between a 
compensatory claim and a restitutionary claim, therefore, the limits of both claims have to 
be carefully considered with proper regard to the facts of the particular case. 
 II. ONE LOSS TO EXPLAIN THEM ALL? 
 The widely accepted goal of compensation is to place A as nearly as possible in a position 
that he or she would have been had the wrong not been committed.  7  While this is usually 
straightforward where A has suffered a pecuniary loss, the same cannot be said of a 
non-pecuniary loss, which is incapable of precise arithmetic measurement. However, 
 4 .  See  Ministry of Defence v Ashman (1993) 66 P & CR 195 (CA). 
 5 .  See  Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v Kaushik Rajiv [2013] SGHC 45; [2013] 2 SLR 543. 
 6 .  Other related terms include “wayleave awards”, “mesne profi ts”, “licence fee damages”, “negotiating 
damages”, “ Wrotham Park damages”, etc. 
 7 .  Livingstone v Rawyard Coal Co (1880) LR 5 App Cas 25 (HL), 39 (Lord Blackburn);  The Liesbosch 
(1933) 45 Ll L Rep 123; [1933] AC 449 (HL), 459 (Lord Wright). See also, for breach of contract,  Robinson v 
Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850, 855 (Parke B). 
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the absence of a pecuniary loss does not necessarily preclude an award of substantial 
damages. For example, pain and suffering is a recognised head of loss that may attract an 
award of substantial damages irrespective of any pecuniary loss that the victim might have 
additionally suffered. Drawing on this example, it has been suggested that a case involving 
infringement of property right could be analysed in the same way. The infringement results 
in a non-pecuniary loss that is independent of any consequential pecuniary loss.  8  This 
allows a more fl exible approach to be adopted in respect of the quantifi cation of damages.  9  
Often, reference is made to a relevant market,  eg the car rental market, as a useful proxy 
measure of A’s loss. In the absence of a relevant market the court may instead refer to a 
hypothetical negotiation between A and B. Thus, in  The Mediana ,  10  where the defendants’ 
negligence temporarily deprived the plaintiffs of a spare lightship, the Earl of Halsbury 
LC acknowledged the “extreme diffi culty” in quantifying the plaintiffs’ loss  11  and said:  12  
 “[A]s a matter of common sense what an arbitrator or a jury very often do is to take a perfectly 
artifi cial hypothesis and say, ‘Well, if you wanted to hire a chair, what would you have to give for it 
for the period’; and in that way they come to a rough sort of conclusion as to what damages ought to 
be paid for the unjust and unlawful withdrawal of it from the owner.” 
 Whether A would have entertained a negotiation was said to be irrelevant, for the 
adopted measure is no more than an artifi cial estimate for A’s non-pecuniary loss. 
 However, the Earl of Halsbury LC’s statement was representative of an era where the 
law of damages was still under-theorised.  13  The quantifi cation of damages was often 
regarded as a question of fact with very few principles involved.  14  As attention began to 
shift towards a principled development of the law of damages, a proper identifi cation of 
A’s loss became necessary. In the context of user damages, this is a tricky issue, which has 
occupied a huge part of the debate. For property torts, specifi cally, popular descriptions 
of A’s loss include: (1) loss of the right of  dominium (control) over the property;  15  (2) loss 
of the right to exclude others from using the property;  16  (3) loss of a power to prevent the 
infringement by applying for ex ante injunctive relief;  17  (4) loss of a right to bargain for a 
relaxation fee  18  etc.  19  
 8 .  The Mediana [1900] AC 113 (HL), 116–117 (Earl of Halsbury LC). See also Lord Scott of Foscote, 
“Damages”  [2007] LMCLQ 465 , 466; Mitchell McInnes, “Gain, Loss and the User Principle” [2006] RLR 76, 85. 
 9 .  See Kelvin FK Low, “The User Principle:  Rashomon Effect or Much Ado about Nothing?” (2016) 28 
SAcLJ 984. 
 10 .  [1900] AC 113 (HL). 
 11 .  Ibid , 116. For a similar judicial sentiment, see  The Greta Holme [1897] AC 596 (HL), 604 (Lord Watson). 
 12 .  [1900] AC 113 (HL) , 116. 
 13 .  Andrew Burrows, “Damages and Rights”, in Donal Nolan and Andrew Robertson (eds),  Rights and 
Private Law (Hart, Oxford, 2012), 275, 276. 
 14 .  See also  British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Railways Co of London 
Ltd [1912] AC 673 (HL), 688–689 (Viscount Haldane LC: “The quantum of damages is a question of fact.”) 
 15 .  McInnes [2006] RLR 76. 
 16 .  Andrew Tettenborn, “What is a Loss?”, in Jason W Neyers, Erika Chamberlain and Stephen GA Pitel 
(eds),  Emerging Issues in Tort Law (Hart, Oxford, 2007), 441, 449. 
 17 .  Kit Barker, “‘Damages Without Loss’: Can Hohfeld Help?” (2014) 34 OJLS 631. 
 18 .  R Sharpe and SM Waddams, “Damages for Lost Opportunity to Bargain” (1982) 1 OJLS 290. 
 19 .  For a related thesis, see Robert Stevens,  Torts and Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), Ch.4, 
arguing that user damages are meant to provide a substitute for the infringed right, not to compensate for loss. 
See also Peter Jaffey, “Licence Fee Damages” [2011] RLR 95, who explains the award on the basis of a primary 
liability arising from the unauthorised use of property. 
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 Clearly, the fi rst three descriptions are phrased in very broad terms. By describing 
A as having suffered a non-pecuniary loss, a fl exible approach to the quantifi cation of 
damages may be adopted, as explained earlier. While each of these descriptions has its 
own strengths and weaknesses, a common problem with all three is that they suggest 
that every infringement of a right results in a loss and warrants an award of substantial 
damages. This view, it is argued, fares poorly in terms of “fi t”, ie, the extent to which the 
view matches the decisions and reasoning in the cases. In the fi rst place, it overlooks the 
role of nominal damages in vindicating an infringed right, which presupposes a distinction 
between establishing a wrong and proving a loss. In cases on wrongful interference with 
chattels, nominal damages were often awarded because A had failed to establish the 
relevant loss. From these cases, it is possible to infer that the identifi cation of the relevant 
loss demands an inquiry into the purpose for which the property is owned. For example, 
a claim for loss of use and a claim for loss of profi ts, while similarly compensatory in 
nature, are very different in character, and this is refl ected in the kind of evidence that 
A is expected to adduce. A related point, which is illustrated by the cases on technical 
trespass, is that, even if A could point to a relevant and compensable head of loss, the 
court may award only nominal damages because the loss is trivial.  20  This suggests that 
the quantum of damages is infl uenced by the consequences of the breach, which may be 
understood as an attempt to moderate the over-inclusiveness of the strict liability wrong 
at the secondary liability stage. 
 These cases, it is argued, suggest that the issue of loss is too diverse to be collapsed 
into one general description. Any attempt to do so is bound to overlook differences, 
which may have important implications on issues of proof, quantifi cation and mitigation. 
In reality, for this very practical topic, the law adopts a bottom-up as opposed to a top-
down approach. Courts are accustomed to approaching compensation for loss at a much 
lower level of generality. A is expected to state precisely what he or she has lost and 
adduce relevant evidence to substantiate his or her claim. On this view, the description 
of A as having lost an opportunity to bargain for a relaxation fee, or simply a loss of 
rental, deserves close attention for it adequately explains a great number of cases on this 
topic. The wholesale rejection of this description, on the ground that it is incapable of 
explaining every case on this topic, is unfortunate and forms a recurring observation in 
this article. 
 In the following three sections, I attempt to show that the fact-sensitive approach 
to compensation for loss is well entrenched in the area of property torts, and a proper 
understanding of this approach could help to address the seemingly indiscriminate awards 
of user and hypothetical negotiation damages in cases concerning infringement of real 
property rights and breach of contract. 
 20 .  Traditionally, nominal damages are awarded only where A has suffered no loss. However, as Professor 
Tettenborn has convincingly argued, loss is not a black-and-white concept and should instead be viewed along a 
spectrum. Thus, instead of speaking about loss or no loss, the better approach would be to examine the degree of 
loss having regard to its impact on A. See Tettenborn,  supra , fn.16, 456–466. Thus, in this article, it is assumed 
that nominal damages may be awarded even if A successfully establishes a loss. 
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 III. WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH CHATTELS 
 (a) What does  Strand Electric stand for? 
 It is useful to begin by examining cases on wrongful interference with chattels, particularly 
by temporary use or detention.  21  Apart from the fact that famous dicta tend to use chattels 
as examples,  22  the cases are also more factually diverse, thus providing a fuller picture of 
how courts approach the issue of compensation for loss. 
 On the award of user damages specifi cally, the Court of Appeal’s decision in  Strand 
Electric and Engineering Co v Brisford Entertainments  23  has often been regarded as the 
 locus classicus .  24  The defendants, who were attempting to sell their theatre, detained 
within it certain equipment belonging to the plaintiffs for 43 weeks, with the hope that 
the theatre would be more attractive to potential buyers or tenants. The plaintiffs claimed 
damages for what they could have earned by letting the equipment for the duration of the 
detention. In the High Court, Pilcher J awarded just half the amount claimed, because 
he found that only about three-quarters of the plaintiffs’ equipment was let at any one 
time and, not infrequently, some were loaned gratis and some might have been accidently 
damaged or destroyed. The Court of Appeal, however, awarded damages assessed at the 
full hire rate and for the entire duration of the detention. 
 The judgments of Somervell and Romer LJJ, who justifi ed the award on the basis of 
compensation for loss, demand particular attention.  25  Their Lordships extended the limits 
of the loss of profi ts argument in a crucial manner. Instead of focusing on the plaintiffs’ 
inability to let the equipment to third parties, Somervell and Romer LJJ were clearly 
concerned with the possibility of letting the equipment to the defendants.  26  Thus, in 
response to the defendants’ argument, that the plaintiffs might not have found hirers even 
if the equipment were returned, Romer LJ said:  27  
 “[A] defendant who has wrongfully detained and profi ted from the property of someone else cannot 
avail himself of a hypothesis such as this. It does not lie in the mouth of such a defendant to suggest 
that the owner might not have found a hirer; for in using the property he showed that he wanted it 
 21 .  The cases tend to refer to conversion and detinue interchangeably. It is only important to note, for our 
present purpose, that user damages are usually relevant only if the chattel is eventually returned. Where B 
permanently deprives A of the chattel, the normal measure of A’s loss is the value of the chattel. 
 22 .  The scenario stated at the outset was a modern rendition of Lord Shaw’s example of a stolen horse in 
 Watson, Laidlaw & Co Ltd v Pott, Cassels and Williamson (1914) 31 RPC 104 (HL), 119. See also  The Mediana 
[1900] AC 113 (HL), 117, where the Earl of Halsbury LC gave the example of a stolen chair. 
 23 .  [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA). 
 24 .  See  Attorney-General v Blake [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL), 278 (Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead);  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch), 813–814 (Brightman 
J);  Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 (CA), 1411–1412 (Nourse LJ), 1416 
(Nicholls LJ). See also  Gaba Formwork Contractors Pty Ltd v Turner Corp Ltd (1991) 32 NSWLR 175 (Giles 
J);  ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily [2013] SGCA 53; [2013] 4 SLR 1317. In the last two cases 
 Strand Electric was considered by the courts at great length. 
 25 .  Denning LJ alone preferred a restitutionary justifi cation of the award. See also his Lordship’s later 
decision in  Penarth Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds  [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359 (CA). 
 26 .  The fi ne distinction between the two arguments have sometimes been overlooked: see eg  Stoke-on-Trent 
City Council v W & J Wass Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 1406 (CA), 1412 (Nourse LJ). See also IM Jackman, “Restitution 
for Wrongs” (1989) 48 CLJ 302, 306. 
 27 .  [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA), 257. 
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and he cannot complain if it is assumed against him that he himself would have preferred to become 
the hirer rather than not have had the use of it at all.” 
 The practical effect of this ingenious assumption was to relieve the plaintiffs from 
having to prove the existence of a healthy market and that they could have profi ted fully 
by letting the equipment.  28  However, in approaching the matter in this manner, both Romer 
and Somervell LJJ regarded as salient facts that: (1) the equipment was profi t-earning 
property; (2) the letting of the equipment was a normal part of the plaintiffs’ business; 
and (3) the defendants had made use of the equipment.  29  Although their Lordships did not 
explicitly say so, there are good reasons for regarding these as pre-conditions for invoking 
the unique loss of profi ts argument. 
 The term profi t-earning property is simply shorthand for chattels that have use value, ie 
those that people would pay for the right to use. For chattels having only exchange value, 
ie those that people would pay for their ownerships and only form the subjects of one-off 
transfers, an award of damages by reference to hire charges is inconceivable.  30  Thus, in 
the Australian case of  Egan v State Transport Authority ,  31  which concerned the wrongful 
detention of machinery and construction materials (steel, cement, rods, etc), damages 
assessed on the basis of use value was available only for the former but not the latter. 
Obviously, the construction materials had no use value; there was no market for hiring raw 
materials.  32  The focus had to be on their exchange value. 
 Merely establishing that the chattel has use value is of course insuffi cient.  33  If A were to 
be described as having lost fees that he or she would have extracted from B for the use of 
the chattel, it naturally follows that A must, in the fi rst place, be willing to let the chattel 
to B. The most direct way for A to prove this is to show that he or she is in the business of 
letting the chattel for a fee, as in  Strand Electric . Where A is not in such a business, A’s 
claim that he or she was willing to let the chattel to B may be perceived as self-serving, and 
hence unpersuasive, unless there is prior indication of such an intention. 
 The reference to B’s use of the chattel has most likely contributed to the association 
of user damages with  Strand Electric . However, while its relevance in a restitutionary 
claim is obvious, precisely why it is necessary in advancing a compensatory argument 
is less clear. I suggest that it is simply a pre-condition to invoking Romer LJ’s novel 
assumption against B.  34  Thus, Romer LJ said that “no such assumption can be made where 
negligence and not improper user is involved”.  35  The precise meaning of “improper user” 
is unclear; but, given that B’s use of A’s chattel is referred to in general terms throughout 
 28 .  In recent times, however, the courts tend to be less demanding in terms of the standard of proof. For 
example, in  Ramzan v Brookwide Ltd [2011] EWHC 2453 (Ch), [59–60], Geraldine Andrews QC used past 
booking records and receipts as bases for extrapolating an estimate of profi ts that the claimant could have 
expected to make had the wrong not occurred. 
 29 .  [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA), 252 (Somervell LJ), 256 (Romer LJ). 
 30 .  See AI Ogus,  The Law of Damages (Butterworths, London, 1973), 160, who distinguished between 
“functional chattels” and “merchantable chattels”. 
 31 .  (1982) 31 SASR 481 (South Australian SC), 530–531 (White J). 
 32 .  See also  Brandeis Goldschmidt & Co v Western Transport Ltd [1981] QB 864 (CA) (discussed below). 
 33 .  See  Thomas Teddy v Kuiper International Pte Ltd [2013] SGHC 7, [43] (Loh J). In this case, the plaintiffs 
were awarded nominal damages only, because the plaintiffs did not own the chattel for the purpose of earning 
profi t. 
 34 .  See  ante , text to fn.27. 
 35 .  [1952] 2 QB 246 (CA), 257. 
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the judgment, the phrase likely includes innocent but wrongful user.  36  If this is right, then 
it is only where B has made no use of A’s chattel that B is allowed to argue that he or she 
would not have paid for the use of the chattel, in which case A cannot insist that B was a 
putative hirer from whom A could have extracted a fee.  37  
 As a whole, the majority’s decision in  Strand Electric is unexceptional in that 
it was concerned with a common claim for loss of profi ts. This was clear from the 
emphasis on the three salient facts in that case. Romer LJ’s assumption against B, 
while decidedly A-friendly, does not fundamentally undermine the description of A 
as having suffered a loss of profi ts, especially given its restricted application.  38  Thus, 
contrary to common perception,  39  there was nothing in the judgment to suggest that 
Romer and Somervell LJJ were attempting to lay down a wider conception of loss in 
support of the general availability of substantial compensatory damages assessed by 
reference to a reasonable hire.  40  Having said this, the unique argument advanced in 
this case signifi cantly extends the limits of compensatory damages. The possibility of 
using this argument to explain other cases commonly associated with user damages 
will be a recurring theme in this article. 
 (b) Identifying the relevant loss 
 As hinted at the outset, the frequent use of broad labels has the tendency to overgeneralise 
the cases, which often leads to a neglect to identify what precisely A had lost. This problem 
is particularly acute in cases concerning infringement of real property rights and breach 
of contract, to which we will turn shortly. Within the tort of interference with goods, 
however, the courts have held fi rmly to the traditional requirement that A must identify 
the relevant loss and prove it. This is neatly illustrated in  Brandeis Goldschmidt & Co v 
Western Transport Ltd ,  41  where Brandon LJ said:  42  
 “Damages in tort are awarded by way of monetary compensation for a loss or losses which a plaintiff 
has actually sustained, and the measure of damages awarded on this basis may vary infi nitely 
according to the individual circumstances of any particular case.” 
 In that case the plaintiffs were in the business of importing raw copper, refi ning it into 
cathodes and reselling the fi nished product. The defendants, pursuant to a non-existent lien, 
wrongfully detained a cargo of copper belonging to the plaintiffs for some nine months. 
Sensibly, the plaintiffs did not rely on  Strand Electric , for obviously the raw copper had 
no use value. Instead, the plaintiffs claimed damages for depreciation in value. But the 
Court of Appeal disagreed that this was an appropriate measure of the plaintiffs’ loss. 
 36 .  An alternative interpretation is that the assumption may be invoked only if B has acted wilfully. 
 37 .  See  General and Finance Facilities Ltd v Cooks Cars (Romford) Ltd [1963] 1 WLR 644 (CA). 
 38 .  See Andrew Burrows,  Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract , 3rd edn (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004), 380, who thought that this was a realistic approach.  Cf Craig Rotherham, “ Wrotham Park 
Damages’ and Account of Profi ts: Compensation or Restitution?”  [2008] LMCLQ 25 , 35; Andrew Tettenborn, 
“Damages in Conversion—The Exception or the Anomaly?” (1993) 52 CLJ 128, 129. 
 39 .  See  supra , fn.24. 
 40 .  See also  infra , fn.128 on the application of mitigation principles. 
 41 .  [1981] QB 864 (CA). 
 42 .  Ibid , 870. See also  Williams v Peel River Land and Mineral Co Ltd (1886) 55 LT 689 (CA), 692 (Bowen LJ). 
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Depreciation in value was relevant only if the plaintiffs intended to resell the raw copper, 
which was not the case here. Any loss must instead relate to the plaintiffs’ business, eg loss 
of profi ts due to delay in the production of copper cathodes. As they failed to adduce any 
evidence of such loss, only nominal damages were awarded. 
 While  Brandeis does not directly engage the discussion on user damages, its relevance 
on the present topic becomes obvious once we vary its facts to involve a chattel having use 
value. Suppose that A, who operates a car repair garage, imports old cars to be dismantled 
for spare parts and B, without permission, takes one of these cars for a joyride. Even 
assuming that there are people who would hire such a car (albeit at a very low price), 
damages cannot be awarded on the basis of a reasonable hire, as this does not accurately 
refl ect A’s loss. Given the purpose for which the car was purchased, A must prove that 
the business of the garage was negatively affected as a result of B’s misappropriation of 
the car. Collectively,  Strand Electric and  Brandeis direct attention to the importance of 
inquiring into the purpose for which A owns the chattel in order to identify what precisely 
A had lost. This would in turn determine what kind of evidence A is required to adduce 
to succeed in recovering substantial damages. The manner in which A’s loss is quantifi ed 
may also vary depending on the nature of the loss. 
 For the same reason, if A owns the chattel not for profi t-earning purposes but for private 
use, a claim for loss of profi ts is bound to fail. But A may instead sue for loss of use (or 
the resulting inconvenience), which is a separate and recognised head of non-pecuniary 
loss.  43  Since the focus is on A’s loss of use, whether B has made any use of the chattel 
is obviously irrelevant. Thus, cases in which B’s negligence had caused A to lose the 
use of a chattel (usually a car or a vessel) offer valuable guidance on issues of proof and 
quantifi cation of damages.  44  Since B has made no use of A’s chattel, one can be sure that 
the courts were awarding compensatory damages, not restitutionary damages. 
 On the issue of proof, loss of use is readily inferred. Thus, in  Lagden v O’Connor ,  45  
Lord Scott of Foscote said, obiter, that: 
 “[A’s] entitlement to general damages would not have depended on the degree of use to which he 
would, if his car had not been damaged, have been likely to put it. He had been deprived of the 
benefi t of having his car available for whatever use he might from time to time decide upon.” 
 However, this inference may be rebutted by evidence that A would clearly not have used 
the chattel or was incapable of using it, for example he or she was overseas on holiday, in 
which case only nominal damages will be awarded.  46  This again emphasises the point that 
A is required to identify the relevant loss and prove it. 
 However, even if A is found to have suffered a loss of use, it is not certain that damages 
will always be assessed on the basis of a reasonable hire. The cases suggest that the measure 
of damages may be different depending on whether A has hired a substitute. The cost 
of hiring a substitute may be recovered, thus approximating an award of user damages. 
 43 .  Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067 (HL), [27] (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
 44 .  See Andrew Tettenborn and David Wilby,  The Law of Damages (LexisNexis, London, 2010), [15.46]; 
Ogus,  The Law of Damages (Butterworth, London, 1973), 159. 
 45 .  Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067 (HL), [76]. 
 46 .  Ibid , [27] (Lord Nicholls);  Giles v Thompson [1994] 1 AC 142 (HL), 167 (Lord Mustill). 
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As shall be explained below, this is explicable on the basis of mitigation principles.  47  
Where no substitute has been hired, the question whether damages will be assessed in 
the same way has met with confl icting judicial opinions. In  Lagden v O’Connor ,  48  Lord 
Scott stated, obiter, that “a fair approach to quantum would be to award a sum based upon 
the spot rate hire charge for a comparable vehicle”. However, the two earlier House of 
Lords cases that Lord Scott cited in support demand cautious treatment. The fi rst case, 
 The Greta Holme ,  49  does not in fact support Lord Scott’s statement. In that case the 
plaintiffs’ dredger was negligently damaged by the defendant’s steamship. During the 
15 weeks when the damaged dredger was undergoing repairs, the plaintiffs did not hire a 
substitute. The plaintiffs adduced evidence showing that a dredger of the same class could 
be hired at a rent of £100 per week and claimed £1,500 as general damages. The House of 
Lords awarded them only £500 but gave no specifi c reason for how the sum was arrived at. 
That was admittedly a random sum, but it is also clear that it was not assessed by reference 
to the market hire rate. The second case,  The Mediana ,  50  offers only indirect support for 
Lord Scott’s statement. The defendants’ steamship negligently collided with, and sank, a 
lightship belonging to the plaintiffs. The damaged lightship was out of commission for 
74 days, during which a spare lightship maintained by the plaintiffs fi lled its role. From 
the judgment, it was revealed that the plaintiffs’ cost of maintaining the spare lightship 
was £1,000 per year. This translates to £202.60 for the 74 days the damaged lightship 
was out of service. However, the House of Lords awarded the plaintiffs £300 but without 
explaining why the larger sum was justifi ed. On the assumption that it would be cheaper 
to maintain a spare lightship than to hire one, a possible explanation is that the award was 
based on the market rate for hiring a similar lightship. However, even assuming that this is 
a correct interpretation of the judgment, this approach has not been applied in subsequent 
House of Lords decisions. Instead, the prevailing approach is to award damages based 
on interest on the capital value of the damaged vessel (normally between 5 and 7 per 
cent) which is usually lower than the market hire rate for a similar vessel.  51  The precise 
reason for preferring this lower measure is unclear; but one possibility is that, where no 
substitute has been hired, A’s loss of use is perceived to be less severe.  52  Regardless, the 
preference for an alternative measure clearly shows that user damages are not available as 
of right. It also illustrates the point that courts do not subscribe to a generalised notion of 
loss. Instead, they pay close attention to the circumstance of each case in determining the 
appropriate measure of A’s loss. 
 We turn to one fi nal scenario. A, a collector of movie memorabilia, owns a Batmobile 
from the 1989 fi lm. The car is proudly displayed in a transparent garage at A’s home. It is 
a working vehicle but, in order to avoid the risk of damage, A never drives it, nor would 
he or she ever let anyone drive it. When A is away from home, B breaks into the garage 
 47 .  See  infra , fn.135. 
 48 .  Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067 (HL), [76]. 
 49 .  [1897] AC 596 (HL). 
 50 .  [1900] AC 113 (HL). 
 51 .  The Marpessa [1907] AC 241 (HL);  The Chekiang (1926) 25 Ll L Rep 173; [1926] AC 637 (HL);  The 
Hebridean Coast [1960] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 423; [1961] AC 545 (HL). 
 52 .  It may also be that, in the absence of other evidence, the fact that A did not hire a substitute suggests that 
he or she did not suffer a loss of use. 
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and takes the Batmobile on a joyride through the town. B returns it, undamaged, to A in 
the morning. In this case, A is unlikely to succeed in arguing loss of use, as it appears that 
he or she would never have driven the car. Similarly, if there is no indication that A was 
intending to make profi ts from his or her memorabilia collection, eg by letting them for 
display in return for fees, a claim for loss of profi ts is bound to fail. The fi rst salient fact 
identifi ed in  Strand Electric is absent. Whether A could nonetheless recover substantial 
compensatory damages would depend on whether the law recognises a separate head of 
loss that covers such a situation. While this is a diffi cult question that is best pursued 
elsewhere, some brief comments can be made here on the assumption that in this situation 
the law is open to allowing recovery of substantial compensatory damages. A’s loss, which 
is most certainly of a non-pecuniary type, must be over and above normal unhappiness 
caused by the infringement. In a normal case, nominal damages are suffi cient to vindicate 
the infringed right. A possible approach would be to require A to show that the chattel 
in question has signifi cant sentimental value, as opposed to a readily replaceable one. 
However, even assuming that A successfully establishes such a loss, and that he or she is 
entitled to an award of substantial damages, it is not certain that the damages would be 
quantifi ed in the same way as user damages. 
 (c) Summary 
 The discussion thus far reveals a number of important points relating to the identifi cation 
and proof of loss as well as the quantifi cation of compensatory damages. First, the 
courts, in awarding compensatory damages, do not refer to broad and abstract notions of 
loss but are accustomed to identifying specifi c heads of loss.  53  Second, A is not free to 
describe his or her loss in whatever way he or she prefers.  54  A possible reason is that this 
is due to the operation of the principle of remoteness. For example, the likelihood of the 
plaintiffs in  Brandeis incurring a loss due to their inability to resell the raw copper was 
not reasonably foreseeable in light of the nature of their business. However, reference 
to the remoteness rule is of limited help where B is not aware of the purpose for which 
A owns the chattel. The more intuitive explanation, as Brandon LJ suggested, is that A 
would only be compensated for a loss that he or she has actually sustained. Third, where 
the relevant loss is not a loss of profi ts of the type identifi ed in  Strand Electric , B’s use 
of the chattel is irrelevant. For example, whether B has made any use of the chattel has 
no relevance to whether A has suffered a loss of use. To employ the term “user damages” 
in this context is misleading. Fourth, the manner in which damages are quantifi ed for the 
different heads of loss tends to differ. If the term “user damages” relies on the similarity 
in quantum as its unifying theme, clearly it derives no clear support from the cases on 
wrongful interference with chattels. 
 53 .  See also McGregor’s listing of the various heads of loss: Harvey McGregor,  McGregor on Damages , 19th 
edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014), [4.049]–[4.061]. 
 54 .  Cf  Hillesden Securities Ltd v Ryjack Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 959, where Parker J referred to a loss of use even 
though the car was owned for profi table letting. 
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 IV. INFRINGEMENT OF REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
 (a) The unclear basis of wayleave awards and mesne profi ts 
 In a series of nineteenth-century cases concerning trespass to land, A was allowed to 
recover from B a reasonable fee, often referred to as “wayleave awards”.  55  However, 
any attempt to draw on these cases in support of the view that substantial compensatory 
damages are available as of right demands cautious treatment, for often A’s loss was either 
not properly identifi ed or not supported by the available evidence. Consider, for example, 
 Whitwham  v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co ,  56  which has often been regarded 
as representative of the wayleave cases. The defendants committed trespass by dumping 
waste on the plaintiffs’ land. In holding that the former were entitled to a wayleave 
award, Lindley LJ made a passing reference to their having lost the use of their land.  57  
The evidence, however, suggests that the plaintiffs’ land was likely undeveloped—hence 
suitable for tipping purposes—and there was no evidence of what use they intended to 
put the land to. More importantly, there were hints in the judgment that the award served 
a restitutionary function, specifi cally to prevent the defendants from benefi ting from 
their wrongdoings.  58  This is likely the reason why in  Livingstone v Rawyard Coal Co ,  59  
which was decided before gain-based damages gained general recognition, the House 
of Lords expressed doubt over wayleave awards. Unfortunately, not only did wayleave 
awards survive this negative treatment, they continue to be cited in support of the general 
availability of substantial compensatory damages in trespass cases.  60  
 The problem with attaching broad labels to damages awards, as alluded to at the 
outset, is their tendency to overgeneralise the cases, which in turn leads to the neglect 
in the proper identifi cation of A’s loss, as demonstrated in  Whitwham itself. A modern 
example is the Court of Appeal decision in  Shi v Jiangsu Native Produce Import & Export 
Corp .  61  The plaintiff continued to reside in rent-free accommodation for employees after 
his employment was terminated. The defendant, who owned the house, sued for “loss 
of rental/mesne profi ts”  62  and successfully recovered substantial damages assessed by 
reference to the market rental. Curiously, Dyson LJ, with whom Waller and Lloyd LJJ 
agreed, merely said that the defendant was deprived of vacant possession of the house.  63  
 55 .  Martin v Porter (1839) 5 M & W 351;  Powell v Aitken (1858) 4 K & J 343;  Jegon v Vivian (1871) LR 
6 Ch App 742;  Phillips v Homfray (1883) 24 Ch D 439;  Whitwham  v Westminster Brymbo Coal and Coke Co 
[1896] 2 Ch 538 (CA). 
 56 .  [1896] 2 Ch 538 (CA). 
 57 .  Ibid , 541. 
 58 .  Ibid , 541,  per Lindley LJ: “It is unjust to leave out of sight the use which the defendants have made of this 
land for their own purposes, and that lies at the bottom of what are called the way-leave cases.” 
 59 .  (1880) 5 App Cas 25 (HL), 38 (Lord Hatherley), 43 (Lord Blackburn). See also  Hilton v Woods (1867) LR 
4 Eq 432 (Ch), 441 (Malins VC);  McGregor on Damages , 19th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014), [37.047]. 
 60 .  An alternative view is that wayleave awards do not apply beyond infringement of property rights: see 
 Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 (CA), 1365 (Dillon LJ); McInnes [2006] 
RLR 76. 
 61 .  [2009] EWCA Civ 1582. See also  Enfi eld LBC v Outdoor Plus Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 608 (CA);  Field 
Common Ltd v Elmbridge BC [2008] EWHC 2079 (Ch);  Stadium Capital Holdings (No 2) Ltd v St Marylebone 
Property Co Plc [2011] EWHC 2856 (Ch); [2012] 1 P & CR 7;  Sinclair v Gavaghan [2007] EWHC 2256 (Ch). 
 62 .  [2010] EWCA Civ 1582, [19]. 
 63 .  Ibid , [24]. 
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This is inconsistent with the cases on wrongful interference with chattels, which show that 
loss of possession is insuffi cient in itself to warrant an award of substantial compensatory 
damages.  64  As the house was not owned for profi table letting but for provision of free 
accommodation to employees, it might have been that the defendant was deprived of 
accommodation space that could have been offered to other employees, as a result of 
which they might have incurred additional expenses to house those employees elsewhere. 
However, no evidence was adduced to support such a claim. In any case, Dyson LJ held, 
in the alternative, that the award was also justifi ed on restitutionary principles.  65  
 (b) Revisiting the  Strand Electric argument 
 Shi is, of course, a case of unusual facts. Where the property is profi tably let, which 
is more often the case, the landowner may rely on  Strand Electric to argue that he or 
she was prepared to let the premises for a fee and that the occupier, having enjoyed the 
use of the premises, is assumed to be willing to rent the premises from the landowner. 
The same argument can be invoked even in the absence of any prior landlord-occupier 
relationship. 
 The case of  Inverugie Investments Ltd v Hackett  66  is a good illustration. The plaintiffs 
owned 30 of 164 apartments which collectively formed a hotel complex. The defendant, 
who acquired the other 134 apartments, ejected the plaintiffs from the 30 apartments and 
assumed sole operation of the entire hotel complex. The evidence showed that, under 
the defendant’s management, the occupancy rate for the hotel complex was between 35 
and 40 per cent, and most of the apartments were let to tour operators at rates below the 
published rates. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, 
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to user damages to be assessed by multiplying the 
operators’ rates and the duration of the trespass (9½ years). Interestingly, his Lordship said 
that the principle upon which the damages were quantifi ed “need not be characterised as 
exclusively compensatory, or exclusively restitutionary; it combines elements of both”.  67  
Although his Lordship did not explicitly say so, the plaintiffs could be understood to 
have suffered a loss of profi ts, given the presence of three salient facts: (1) the apartments 
were profi t-earning property; (2) they were part of a hotel complex for profi table letting; 
and (3) the defendant used the apartments for its hotel business. On these facts, it is to 
be assumed that the defendant would have preferred to rent the apartments from the 
plaintiffs than not have possession of them. This analysis is consistent with the fi nding 
that the award was available regardless of whether the plaintiffs could show that they 
would have let the apartments to anybody else,  68  as well as the assessment of the award 
based on 100 per cent occupancy despite the lower hotel occupancy rate.  69  These show 
that his Lordship was referring to the loss of an opportunity to charge the defendant 
rentals (as in  Strand Electric ) as opposed to the loss of opportunity to profi tably let the 
 64 .  See eg  Brandeis Goldschmidt & Co v Western Transport Ltd [1981] QB 864 (CA). 
 65 .  [2010] EWCA Civ 1582, [25–27]. 
 66 .  [1995] 1 WLR 713 (PC). 
 67 .  Ibid , 718. 
 68 .  Ibid , 717. 
 69 .  Ibid , 718–719. 
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apartments to third parties. Given the considerable reach of the  Strand Electric argument, 
it is somewhat surprising that it has not been invoked more frequently in the context of 
trespass to land.  70  
 As explained at the outset, an underestimation of the limits of compensation for 
loss may disadvantage A, particularly where B successfully invokes a restitutionary 
defence. This is aptly illustrated by the Singapore case of  Cavenagh Investment Pte Ltd v 
Kaushik Rajiv .  71  The simplifi ed facts were these. An employee of the plaintiff company, 
purporting to act in its behalf, let its apartment to the defendant for a monthly rental of 
$9,000. As it transpired, the employee had done so without the plaintiff’s permission 
and knowledge. By the time the fraud was discovered, the defendant had been paying 
rentals to the rogue employee for the past 28 months. The plaintiff brought proceedings 
for trespass and claimed to be entitled to “market rental” of $10,000 per month for the 
duration of the trespass. In the Singapore High Court, Chan J found the plain reference 
to “market rental” to be unhelpful.  72  Recognising that the characterisation of the claim 
as either compensatory or restitutionary may have practical bearings, both claims were 
considered separately.  73  The plaintiff’s restitutionary claim failed because it was found 
that the defendant had changed his position in good faith by paying the rentals to the rogue 
employee.  74  Interestingly, the plaintiffs’ compensatory claim was also dismissed. On the 
facts, it was found that the plaintiffs were unwilling to let the apartment for less than 
$10,000 per month and they did not receive any offer meeting this requirement during the 
relevant period. In light of this, Chan J held that the plaintiffs could not be said to have lost 
the opportunity to earn $10,000 per month by letting the apartment to another person.  75  
 Although Chan J discussed the Privy Council decision in  Inverugie , he did not 
consider the possibility that the award in that case could be justifi ed on the basis of 
the  Strand Electric argument, as explained earlier. That argument focused on the loss 
of an opportunity to let the apartment to the defendant, not loss of an opportunity to 
let the apartment to a third party. The preconditions to invoking that argument were 
present on the facts of  Cavenagh : (1) the apartment was a profi t-earning property; (2) the 
plaintiff, being a subsidiary of a property management company, was in the business 
of letting the apartment for profi t; and (3) the defendant has enjoyed the occupation of 
the apartment. On these facts, it can be fairly assumed that the defendant would have 
preferred to become the tenant than not to have the occupation of the apartment. Had it 
 70 .  For cases where this argument could apply, see eg  Swordheath Properties v Tabet [1979] 1 WLR 285 
(CA);  Ministry of Defence v Ashman (1993) 66 P & CR 195 (CA);  Gafford v Graham (1999) 77 P & CR 73 (CA); 
 Gondal v Dillon Newsagents Ltd [2001] RLR 221 (CA);  Hampton v BHP Billiton Minerals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2012] 
WASC 285 (Western Australia SC). 
 71 .  [2013] SGHC 45; [2013] 2 SLR 543 (Singapore HC). 
 72 .  Ibid , [44]. 
 73 .  Ibid , [49– 51]. 
 74 .  Ibid , [58–75]. This article proceeds on the assumption that the change of position defence does apply to 
restitution for wrongs. But it should noted that this is an issue that has attracted confl icting academic opinions. 
For the view that the defence should apply, see Graham Virgo,  The Principles of the Law of Restitution , 3rd edn 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), 696. For a more cautious view, see Elise Bant,  The Change of Position 
Defence (Hart, Oxford, 2009), 166–172; Andrew Burrows,  The Law of Restitution , 3rd edn (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011), 699–700; Rachel Leow, “Change of Position in Restitution for Wrongs: A View From 
Singapore” (2014) 130 LQR 18. 
 75 .  Ibid , [52]. 
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been so argued, the plaintiff would likely have recovered damages assessed by reference 
to the existing rental rate of $9,000 per month. The failure to put forth this argument 
was somewhat surprising in light of the earlier Singapore High Court decision in  Yenty 
Lily v Aces System Development Pte Ltd ,  76  where Prakash J specifi cally alluded to the 
assumption invoked against the defendants in  Strand Electric . 
 (c)  Wrotham Park damages 
 Wrotham Park damages are often associated with user damages.  77  In the eponymous case, 
 Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd ,  78  the defendants built houses on their 
land in breach of a restrictive covenant which benefi ted the plaintiffs’ land. Brightman J, 
having refused a mandatory injunction to tear down the houses on policy grounds, 
awarded the plaintiffs damages assessed at 5 per cent of the defendants’ profi ts from 
selling those houses, being a sum the former could reasonably have extracted from the 
latter. The peculiar aspect of this case is that the plaintiffs did not appear to have suffered 
any pecuniary loss. The defendant’s breach did not affect the value of the plaintiffs’ land. 
Nor did the plaintiffs lose an opportunity to charge the defendants a relaxation fee in light 
of the fi nding that the former would never have agreed to relax the restrictive covenant. 
Although it is possible that the plaintiffs might have suffered a non-pecuniary loss of some 
kind, eg loss of a green view, the fact of the matter is that such a loss was neither argued 
by the plaintiffs nor found by Brightman J.  79  
 Wrotham Park was subsequently applied in cases concerning trespass to land  80  and 
nuisance.  81  A common feature of these cases is the diffi culty in identifying what precisely 
A had lost. They appear to contradict cases where only nominal damages were awarded 
because A has suffered no real loss.  82  Thus, despite judicial pronouncements that  Wrotham 
Park damages are compensatory in nature,  83  the majority of academic writings on this topic 
 76 .  [2012] SGHC 208; [2013] 1 SLR 577, [48]. See also  ACES System Development Pte Ltd v Yenty Lily 
[2013] SGCA 53; [2013] 4 SLR 1317, [35]. 
 77 .  See eg  Pell Frischmann Engineering Ltd v Bow Valley Iran Ltd [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370, 
[48], where Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe regarded both awards to be based on the same principle. 
 78 .  [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch). See also  Gafford v Graham (1999) 77 P & CR 73 (CA);  Harris v Williams-
Wynne [2006] EWCA Civ 104. 
 79 .  See eg James Edelman, “The Meaning of Loss and Enrichment”, in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell 
and James Penner (eds),  Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2009), 211, 214. 
 80 .  See eg  Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408 (Ch);  Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA);  AMEC 
Developments Ltd v Jury’s Hotel Management (UK) Ltd (2001) 82 P & CR 22 (Ch). 
 81 .  See eg  Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates [1986] 1 WLR 922 (Ch);  Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd 
v Fairpoint [2007] EWHC 212; [2007] 1 WLR 2167 (Ch). 
 82 .  See eg  Behrens v Richards [1905] 2 Ch 614 (Ch);  Harrison v Duke of Rutland [1893] 1 QB 142 (CA); 
 Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd [1959] 2 QB 384 (CA);  Ward v Kirkland [1967] Ch 194 (Ch);  Hanina v 
Morland (22 Nov 2000) Unreported (CA). A court may also vindicate the infringement by making an appropriate 
declaration: see  eg Llandudno UBC v Woods [1899] 2 Ch 705 (Ch);  Stonebridge v Bygrave (25 Oct 2001) 
Unreported (Ch);  Minor v Groves (2000) 80 P & Cr 136 (CA). 
 83 .  Pell Frischmann Engineering Ltd v Bow Valley Iran Ltd [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370;  WWF—
World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2007] EWCA Civ 286; [2008] 1 
WLR 445;  Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 
830. See also Part V below. 
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focused instead on explaining the award on a restitutionary basis.  84  While approaching 
the issue in this manner has its benefi ts, it must not distract attention from the equally 
important task of attempting to develop a compensatory analysis. To be sure, where A is 
willing to negotiate a relaxation of his or her right in return for a fee, the  Strand Electric 
argument could be applied.  85  But, where there is clear fi nding that A would not have 
negotiated, a different description of A’s loss must be found.  86  
 An important clue hinted in several of these cases is that  Wrotham Park damages were 
usually awarded in lieu of an injunction pursuant to Lord Cairns’ Act.  87  In  Armstrong v 
Sheppard & Short Ltd ,  88  where only nominal damages were awarded for the defendant’s 
trespass, Lord Evershed MR suggested that a different measure of damages might apply had 
the claim been argued on the basis of Lord Cairns’ Act. Indeed, in  Wrotham Park itself,  89  
Brightman J justifi ed the award by reference to Lord Cairns’ Act, albeit without explaining 
its signifi cance. This issue was revisited and thoroughly examined by the Court of Appeal 
in  Jaggard v Sawyer .  90  The case offers important insights into the kind of substantive 
change that Lord Cairns’ Act had introduced into the law of damages. As Lord Bingham 
MR explained, “[s]uch damages can only have been intended to compensate the plaintiff 
for future unlawful conduct the commission of which, in the absence of any injunction, 
the court must have contemplated as likely to occur”.  91  Similarly, Millett LJ said that such 
damages “relate to the future, not the past”.  92  These statements suggest that A has suffered 
a future loss, a view which fi nds support in the distinction drawn by Viscount Finlay in 
 Leeds Industrial Co-Operative Society v Slack  93  between “injury already sustained” and 
“injury that would be infl icted in the future”. While both types of loss may be the subject 
matter of compensation where damages are awarded in lieu of an injunction, the award 
necessarily relates to a future loss.  94  Given that A can be compensated with substantial 
damages even in the absence of any incurred loss, the future loss is most likely of an 
entirely different kind. 
 84 .  See eg Andrew Burrows, “Are ‘Damages on the Wrotham Park Basis’ Compensatory, Restitutionary or 
Neither?”, in Djakhongir Saidov and Ralph Cunnington (eds),  Contract Damages: Domestic and International 
Perspectives (Hart, Oxford, 2008) 165, 169–170; Rotherham  [2008] LMCLQ 25 ; James Edelman,  Gain-Based 
Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual Property (Hart, Oxford, 2002), 100. 
 85 .  See eg  Gafford v Graham (1999) 77 P & CR 73 (CA). 
 86 .  See eg  Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch);  Bracewell v Appleby 
[1975] Ch 408 (Ch). In such cases, it would be incorrect to suggest that A had lost an opportunity to charge 
B a relaxation fee:  Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 (CA) 1369 (Steyn LJ); 
 Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830, [45] 
(Mance LJ). 
 87 .  Chancery Amendment Act 1858, s.2; now Senior Courts Act 1981, s.50. See  Wrotham Park Estate Co 
Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch);  Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408 (Ch);  Jaggard v Sawyer 
[1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA);  Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 430; [2007] 
L & TR 6. 
 88 .  [1959] 2 QB 384 (CA), 397.  Cf  Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 (CA), 
1364, 1368, 1371 (Dillon LJ). 
 89 .  [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch), 811. 
 90 .  [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA). 
 91 .  Ibid , 276–277. 
 92 .  Ibid , 284. 
 93 .  [1924] AC 851 (HL), 859. 
 94 .  Ibid . 
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 Elsewhere, I have argued that the future loss is best understood as a loss of the ability 
to sue for future infringements.  95  The starting point is to realise that, even if A is refused 
an injunction, he or she is not thereafter barred from suing on the persisting infringement. 
In the case of trespass, which is actionable per se, A may sue as many times as he or she 
likes. For other types of infringement, a new cause of action may arise if A successfully 
proves a compensable loss, for example due to a change in circumstances. Concerned with 
the potential multiplicity of future claims, courts have invoked the jurisdiction conferred 
by Lord Cairns’ Act to award damages in respect of future infringement(s) as a means of 
achieving fi nality in the settlement of the dispute.  96  The practical effect of this damages 
award is to sanction the indefi nite continuance of the wrong which might otherwise have 
given rise to fresh causes of action. This unique function of  Wrotham Park damages was 
hinted in a crucial but often overlooked statement by Millett LJ in  Jaggard :  97  
 “The court can in my judgment properly award damages ‘once and for all’ in respect of future 
wrongs because it awards them in substitution for an injunction and to compensate for those future 
wrongs which an injunction would have prevented. The doctrine of res judicata operates to prevent 
the plaintiff and his successors in title from bringing proceedings thereafter to recover even nominal 
damages in respect of further wrongs for which the plaintiff has been fully compensated.” 
 Understanding  Wrotham Park damages as compensating A for loss of the ability to 
sue for future infringements has obvious advantages. Given that the prospect of future 
claims arising, and what A could expect to recover through those claims, are necessarily 
matters of pure conjecture, A’s loss is best understood to be non-pecuniary in nature. 
Thus, a court is free to adopt any suitable measure in assessing damages for loss of 
the ability to sue for future wrongs. The currently preferred measure, which is based 
on a hypothetical bargain, is therefore no more than a convenient tool of quantifi cation 
and may be modifi ed or even abandoned in favour of other suitable measures where 
appropriate.  98  Once this is understood, it is easy to see why the hypothetical bargain 
measure does not necessarily refl ect A’s loss. This is to be contrasted with the attempt 
to infer A’s loss from the preferred measure, most notably the suggestion that A has lost 
an opportunity to charge B a relaxation fee,  99  which had been rightly criticised for being 
fi ctitious where A would not have entertained any negotiation.  100  This criticism is avoided 
altogether under the proposed analysis. 
 One fi nal point merits attention. The relationship between  Wrotham Park damages 
and an injunction has been a source of considerable confusion. It has been variously 
 95 .  Alvin W-L See, “Unlocking  Wrotham Park Damages: Lord Cairns’ Act and Loss of the Ability to Sue for 
Future Infringements” [2017] Conv 339. 
 96 .  See Katy Barnett and Michael Bryan, “Lord Cairns’s Act: A Case Study in the Unintended Consequence 
of Legislation” (2015) 9 J Eq 150, 154–155. 
 97 .  [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA), 286;  ibid , 280–281 (Lord Bingham MR). See also  City of London Brewery Co v 
Tennant (1873) LR 9 Ch App 212 (CA), 218 (James LJ), 219 (Lord Selborne LC);  Lady Stanley of Alderley v 
Earl of Shrewsbury (1875) LR 19 Eq 616 (Ch), 622 (Hall V-C). 
 98 .  See eg Peter Devonshire, “The Hypothetical Negotiation Measure: An Untenable Fiction?”  [2012] 
LMCLQ 393 . 
 99 .  Sharpe & Waddams (1982) 1 OJLS 290 . 
 100 .  Surrey County Council v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361 (CA), 1369 (Steyn LJ);  Experience 
Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830, [45] (Mance LJ). 
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suggested that  Wrotham Park damages are meant to compensate A for “the court’s 
decision not to grant equitable relief”,  101  “what is lost by the refusal of the injunction”,  102  
“loss of the ability to obtain an injunction”,  103  “the economic value of the equitable relief 
withheld”,  104  and so on.  105  These statements are misleading at a fundamental level. They 
overlook the crucial fact that A’s future loss arises not because the court refuses to grant 
an injunction but because the court decides to have the dispute settled once and for all 
by an award of damages. The award is both the cause of, and the remedy for, A’s future 
loss. The court’s refusal to grant an injunction, while an important factor to be taken 
into account, does not dictate an award of  Wrotham Park damages. In the appropriate 
circumstances, the court may refuse both remedies and leave A with the right to bring 
future claims.  106  
 If the proposed analysis of  Wrotham Park damages is accepted, it adds a second string 
to A’s bow when pursuing a claim for compensation. However, given its unique function, 
this remedy is available only if the infringement is a continuing one that is capable of 
giving rise to future claims. The failure to recognise this has led to its indiscriminate 
award in a number of contract cases, to which we will turn shortly. Like  Strand Electric , 
 Wrotham Park is best understood as concerning a very specifi c kind of loss, and therefore 
it offers no support for the view that substantial compensatory damages are generally 
available. 
 (d) Summary 
 The development of the law of damages in the area of wrongful interference with real 
property rights is best described as haphazard. Unlike the cases concerning wrongful 
interference with chattels, here the distinction between compensation and restitution is 
often blurred. On a closer examination, however, in many of the cases the award of 
substantial damages is explicable on the basis of compensation for A’s loss of profi ts, 
particularly of the kind identifi ed in  Strand Electric . Even  Wrotham Park damages, 
which have been traditionally regarded as an oddity, may be understood as compensating 
A for a very specifi c kind of loss. As a whole, therefore, these cases are not entirely 
inconsistent with the basic principle established in the cases on wrongful interference 
with chattels, which require A to identify a relevant loss and prove it by adducing the 
relevant evidence. 
 101 .  Pell Frischmann Engineering Ltd v Bow Valley Iran Ltd [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370, [48] 
(Lord Walker). 
 102 .  Leeds Industrial Co-Operative Society v Slack [1924] AC 851 (HL), 859; affi rmed in  Attorney-General 
v Blake [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 281 (Lord Nicholls). 
 103 .  Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd v Fairpoint [2007] EWHC 212; [2007] 1 WLR 2167 (Ch), [3] (Gabriel 
Moss QC). 
 104 .  Katy Barnett and Michael Bryan, “Lord Cairns’s Act: A Case Study in the Unintended Consequence of 
Legislation” (2015) 9 J Eq 150, 154. 
 105 .  Barker (2014) 34 OJLS 631. 
 106 .  PH Pettit, “Lord Cairns’ Act in the County Court: A Supplementary Note” (1977) 36 CLJ 369, 371; 
commenting on  Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652 (HL). 
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 V. BREACH OF CONTRACT 
 Just as properties may be owned for different purposes, contracts too may serve different 
purposes. While the vast majority of contract disputes concern claims for pecuniary losses, 
the courts have, on appropriate occasions, awarded damages for non-pecuniary losses, 
for example loss of pleasurable amenity, loss of enjoyment, distress, etc.  107  Thus, it may 
be observed that, broadly refl ecting the pattern in tort law, contract damages are meant to 
compensate for specifi c heads of loss. Unfortunately, this pattern is disrupted by recent 
attempts to expand the availability of  Wrotham Park damages to breach of contract cases, 
which have been pursued with very little regard to basic principles of compensation.  108  
This part of the article identifi es where the errors lie and explains why  Wrotham Park 
damages are, as a matter of principle, rarely available for breach of contract. 
 (a) The semantic trap 
 In  Attorney-General v Blake ,  109  Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead saw  Wrotham Park as 
authority for the proposition that “[i]n a suitable case damages for breach of contract 
may be measured by the benefi t gained by the wrongdoer from the breach”. This has 
generally been understood as a reference to restitutionary/disgorgement damages.  110  Yet 
his Lordship also affi rmed the role of damages awarded in lieu of an injunction pursuant to 
Lord Cairns’ Act in compensating A for a future loss.  111  Unfortunately, the expropriation 
of the term “ Wrotham Park damages” to refer to restitutionary/disgorgement damages, 
contrary to the compensatory analysis of the eponymous case in  Jaggard , has introduced a 
semantic trap, which has set the development of  Wrotham Park damages in an unexpected 
direction. 
 Later cases, purportedly following  Blake , declared that  Wrotham Pa rk damages are 
to be understood independently of Lord Cairns’ Act.  112  However, they continue to insist 
that the award serves a compensatory goal, but on the basis that it is available whenever 
it is a just response or is necessary to avoid manifest injustice, for example where A 
encounters diffi culty in proving fi nancial loss.  113  Not only does this set us back to square 
one in the attempt to identify A’s loss, it also opens the door to the indiscriminate award 
 107 .  See eg  Farley v Skinner [2001] UKHL 49; [2002] 2 AC 732 (HL);  Ruxley Electronics and Construction 
Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344 (HL);  Jarvis v Swans Tours Ltd [1973] QB 233 (CA);  Jackson v Horizon Holidays 
Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468 (CA). See generally Hugh Beale (ed),  Chitty on Contracts , 32nd edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2015), [26.140]–[26.149]; Edwin Peel,  Treitel on the Law of Contract , 14th edn (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2015), [20.082]–[20.092]; Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows and John Cartwright,  Anson’s Law of 
Contract , 13th edn (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016), 566–570. 
 108 .  See [2017] Conv 339. 
 109 .  [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 283–284. 
 110 .  Cf McInnes [2006] RLR 76. 
 111 .  [2000] UKHL 45; [2001] 1 AC 268, 281. 
 112 .  Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830, 
[16] (Mance LJ);  WWF—World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation Entertainment Inc [2007] 
EWCA Civ 286; [2008] 1 WLR 445, [54] (Chadwick LJ). 
 113 .  Ibid . See also  One Step (Support) Ltd v Morris-Garner [2016] EWCA Civ 180; [2017] QB 1, [81], [119] 
(Christopher Clarke LJ);  Abbar v Saudi Economic and Development Co [2012] EWHC 1414 (Ch), [224] (David 
Richards J). 
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of substantial compensatory damages based on very loose guidelines. Curiously, when 
the issue was revisited by the Privy Council in  Pell Frischmann ,  114  Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe, although having cited some of these earlier cases with approval, continued 
to use the term “ Wrotham Park damages” to mean damages awarded under Lord Cairns’ 
Act. Although this may seem to have taken the law one step forward, the award of  Wrotham 
Park damages in that case was itself problematic, for it was not in lieu of an injunction but 
as a standalone remedy. 
 (b) Extending  Wrotham Park damages to breach of contract cases 
 Based on the analysis of  Wrotham Park damages proposed earlier, the availability of such 
an award in contract cases is necessarily more limited due to the fact that most breaches 
of contract result in “a single, once and for all, past breach” as opposed to “a continuing 
one capable of generating further losses”.  115  It is therefore unsurprising that there has 
yet to be any attempt to extend the availability of  Wrotham Park damages beyond cases 
involving breach of negative contractual covenants. Even in such cases the period of 
prohibition is usually rather short.  116  If all the relevant losses can be determined fully 
at the date of judgment, neither an injunction nor  Wrotham Park damages would be a 
relevant remedy. 
 This is precisely why  Pell Frischmann is problematic. The case concerned an attempt 
to bid for an oilfi eld project in Iran. The claimant, who assumed the responsibility of 
negotiating with the Iranian oil company, invited the defendants to bid for the project 
jointly but on the conditions that the defendants should not directly contact the Iranian 
company without the claimant’s consent and should work exclusively with the claimant 
on this project. In breach of this agreement, the defendants tendered for the project on 
their own and were eventually awarded the project. The Privy Council awarded  Wrotham 
Park damages assessed by reference to a hypothetical buy-out by the defendants of the 
claimant’s interest in the project. While the result is undeniably right, the court’s reference 
to Lord Cairns’ Act was, with respect, questionable. By the time the claimant brought 
the proceedings, which was more than six years after the breach, the defendants had 
already completed the project. The claimant’s loss, being simply a loss of profi ts, could 
be determined fully at the date of judgment. Thus, neither  Wrotham Park damages nor an 
injunction was relevant at this point. As it turned out, the claimant’s incurred loss could 
be readily established by applying the  Strand Electric argument. Since the claimant was 
willing to relax the contractual prohibitions and sell its interest to the defendants if the 
price was right, the former could be understood to have lost an opportunity to charge the 
defendants a buy-out fee. 
 114 .  [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370, [46]. 
 115 .  Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA), 291 (Millett LJ), commenting on the House of Lords 
decision in  Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 (HL), which concerned a simple breach of contract for the sale of 
land by the seller. 
 116 .  Exceptionally, the negative covenant may operate permanently. See eg  Lane v O’Brien Homes [2004] 
EWHC 303 (QB), which concerned a collateral contract prohibiting the defendant from building more than three 
new houses on its land. 
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 The same may be said of the award of  Wrotham Park damages in  One Step (Support) 
Ltd v Morris-Garner .  117  The defendant sold its business to the claimants subject to a 
number of non-competition clauses, which were to operate for 36 months from the date 
of the sale. In breach of these clauses, the defendant set up a competing business. By the 
time proceedings were brought, however, more than fi ve and a half years had elapsed since 
the date of the sale. In such a case, neither an injunction nor  Wrotham Park damages were 
relevant. Instead, damages should have been assessed by reference to estimated loss of 
profi ts caused by the competing business. 
 (c) Damages awarded in addition to an injunction 
 A related problem is the suggestion that  Wrotham Park damages may be awarded in 
addition to an injunction. Based on the analysis proposed earlier, this cannot be right. 
Since an injunction and  Wrotham Park damages are alternative means of achieving fi nality 
in the settlement of a dispute, a court may not award both remedies at once but has to 
choose between them. Thus, where damages are awarded in addition to an injunction, 
they necessarily relate only to incurred losses, which must be identifi ed and proved in the 
ordinary manner.  118  In overlooking this point, courts have purportedly awarded  Wrotham 
Park damages in addition to an injunction. More unfortunately, the courts have also failed 
squarely to address the issue of loss. 
 In  Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc ,  119  the defendant, who was in 
possession of certain master recordings of the late Jimi Hendrix’s performances, allowed 
third parties to use them in return for payments. This was in breach of a settlement 
agreement entered into with the estate of Jimi Hendrix, the benefi t of which was assigned 
to the claimant. The Court of Appeal granted an injunction and additionally awarded 
 Wrotham Park damages. On the facts, the damages award was in fact explicable on ordinary 
principles of compensation, specifi cally by invoking the  Strand Electric argument. The 
claimant was in the business of licensing the recordings for profi ts. As the defendant 
benefi ted from the use of the recordings, it is to be assumed that it would have preferred 
to pay to obtain the claimant’s permission than not to have the use of the recordings at all. 
Thus, the claimant could be said to have lost an opportunity to charge the defendant fees 
for the use of the recordings. 
 The case of  WWF—World Wide Fund for Nature v World Wrestling Federation 
Entertainment Inc ,  120  although problematic for the same reason, is less straightforward 
in so far as identifi cation of the claimant’s loss is concerned. The defendant was in 
breach of a settlement agreement which restricted its use of the initials “WWF”. As in 
 Experience Hendrix , the Court of Appeal awarded  Wrotham Park damages in addition 
to an injunction. Although Chadwick LJ insisted that the award was compensatory, the 
judgment made no mention of the loss that the claimant has suffered.  121  The prohibition 
 117 .  [2016] EWCA Civ 180; [2017] QB 1. 
 118 .  Leeds Industrial Co-Operative Soc v Slack [1924] AC 851 (HL), 859 (Viscount Finlay). 
 119 .  [2003] EWCA Civ 323; [2003] 1 All ER (Comm) 830. 
 120 .  [2007] EWCA Civ 286; [2008] 1 WLR 445. 
 121 .  Ibid , [29–56]. 
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under the settlement agreement was most likely to prevent the claimant’s reputation 
from being damaged through mistaken association. However, in the High Court, Peter 
Smith J expressed doubt over the alleged damage to reputation, since there was “no 
attempt to identify such prospects in actual diminution terms”.  122  If what he meant was 
that the claimant had failed to prove its loss of reputation, then ordinary principles of 
compensation dictate that only nominal damages should have been awarded.  123  While the 
decision may ultimately be justifi ed on restitutionary principles, one could be forgiven 
for lamenting the missed opportunity to consider whether loss of reputation resulting 
from a breach of contract is a compensable head of loss, which remains an unsettled 
question.  124  
 (d) Summary 
 The attempt to expand the availability of  Wrotham Park damages to contract cases, 
while a worthy endeavour, has unfortunately been undermined by the lack of regard 
for basic principles of compensation. In particular, the courts, while insisting that the 
remedy serves a compensatory function, persistently fail to identify A’s loss. Instead, 
they favour the view that  Wrotham Park damages may be awarded whenever it is a just 
response, which would inevitably lead to arbitrary awards and over-compensation. But 
the real irony, as illustrated in  Experience Hendrix and  Pell Frischmann , is that many of 
these cases are in fact concerned with conventional heads of loss, and thus explicable 
on ordinary principles of compensation. This supports the hypothesis, suggested at the 
outset, that broad labels have the tendency to distract attention from the importance of 
squarely addressing questions of loss. 
 VI. MITIGATION 
 According to Professor Barker, who suggests that A is best described as having lost a legal 
power to prevent the infringement of his or her claim-rights by obtaining  ex ante injunctive 
relief, mitigation principles are irrelevant because:  125  
 “The loss of A’s power to stop an infringement through injunction is direct and immediate and—
precisely because it is brought about  by the infringement itself —not something that A can reasonably 
be expected,  post-infringement , to mitigate.” 
 From the earlier discussion, however, it is clear that the courts do not adopt such a 
broad description of A’s loss, much less in the terms suggested by Professor Barker. If 
one agrees with the observation in this article that the majority of cases on this topic are 
consistent with ordinary principles of compensation, there would be no logical reason to 
 122 .  [2006] EWHC 184 (Ch), [56]. 
 123 .  Cf Pey-Woan Lee, “A New Model of Contractual Compensation”  [2006] LMCLQ 452 . 
 124 .  See  Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA [1997] UKHL 23; [1998] AC 20 (HL), 
40–41 (Lord Nicholls), 50 (Lord Steyn). 
 125 .  Barker (2014) 34 OJLS 631, 645. 
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deny the relevance of mitigation principles. In so far as contract damages are concerned, 
it is clear that the failure to mitigate one’s loss may lead to a reduction in the quantum 
of compensatory damages.  126  Similarly, in  Uzinterimpex JSC v Standard Bank Plc ,  127  
Moore-Bick LJ expressed a strong view that mitigation principles apply generally to 
losses resulting from conversion of goods. By parity of reasoning, the same ought to be 
true for losses arising from infringement of real property rights. If this is right, then it is 
important to keep an eye on potential issues of mitigation when faced with a claim for 
user damages. 
 That mitigation principles are relevant to damages assessed by reference to a reasonable 
hire was put beyond doubt in the case of  Lime Free Water and General Services Ltd and 
Permutit Body Ltd v Econowash Ltd and M Quinlan .  128  The defendants, who operated a 
launderette, detained a water softener belonging to the plaintiffs. Although the detention 
began in mid-1976, and despite the defendants’ refusal to pay the hire charges, the 
plaintiffs did not commence legal proceedings to recover the water softener until some 
time in 1979. The trial judge, applying  Strand Electric , awarded the plaintiffs damages, 
the quantum of which was arrived at by multiplying a weekly rate of £4 by the duration 
of the detention (approximately four years). The Court of Appeal, however, reduced the 
multiplier from four years to just two years on the ground that the plaintiffs should have 
mitigated their loss by duly bringing legal proceedings. Eveleigh LJ, while expressing 
sympathy with the plaintiffs’ reluctance to take a client to court, drew attention to 
the reality that “the longer proceedings are delayed the greater will the damages be if 
the court assesses them on a hire charge basis”. This decision hints at the answer to a 
question relating to theft posed by Moore-Bick LJ in  Uzinterimpex :  129  
 “Is [A] obliged to negotiate with the thief to purchase its return? Probably not, because it would be 
offensive to ordinary notions of morality to expect him to do so, but, if he had the chance to recapture 
his property without risk to himself, he might reasonably be expected to take it.” 
 In such a situation, it would surely be reasonable to expect A to inform the relevant 
enforcement authority. If A’s car is taken for a month-long joyride by B, and assuming that 
the enforcement authority could reasonably be expected to recover the car from B within 
a week had A been prompt in making a report, A’s recoverable loss should be assessed by 
reference to one week’s detention. 
 Mitigation principles tend to apply in a less straightforward manner to damages 
assessed on the hypothetical negotiation basis, given the usual absence of a multiplier to 
which the reduction may apply. However, the cases on  Wrotham Park damages clearly 
show that A’s inaction or delay in bringing legal proceedings will be taken into account 
in assessing the quantum of the award. The cases reveal two alternative approaches to 
how the reduction in quantum may be achieved. The fi rst approach, which was applied 
by Brightman J in  Wrotham Park , requires a court to “act with great moderation” in 
 126 .  British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Railways Co of 
London Ltd [1912] AC 673 (HL). 
 127 .  [2008] EWCA Civ 819; [2008] Bus LR 1762;  [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 456 , [54–69]. 
 128 .  (5 May 1981) Unreported (CA). 
 129 .  [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 456 (CA), [55]. 
©I
nf
or
m
a 
nu
ll -
 1
7/
12
/2
01
8 
06
:2
9
 USER DAMAGES AND COMPENSATORY REASONING 95
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
determining what would be an appropriate sum to be awarded to A.  130  This approach was 
also applied in  Pell Frischmann in light of A’s “extraordinary and unexplained delay”.  131  
The second method, which was hinted by Graham J in  Bracewell v Appleby ,  132  is to 
ignore A’s superior bargaining position and to regard him or her as “as being willing 
to accept a fair price”. Similarly, in  Jaggard , Lord Bingham MR said that, even if A 
was reluctant to entertain a bargain, he or she ought to be treated as a reasonable seller 
and that “the court will not value the right at the ransom price which a very reluctant 
plaintiff might put on it”.  133  While the courts did not explicitly say that they were 
applying principles of mitigation, to regard them as having done so is consistent with 
a compensatory account of  Wrotham Park damages.  134  Indeed, it is diffi cult to see how 
A’s inaction or delay is relevant if a claim for  Wrotham Park damages is characterised as 
restitutionary in nature, except where the claim is time-barred. The fact that in all these 
cases A was awarded substantial damages, albeit at a reduced quantum, suggests that 
limitation period was not an issue. 
 We turn to one fi nal point. What A may do (as opposed to what he or she is expected 
to do) to mitigate his or her loss necessarily depends on the nature of the loss. It is 
well accepted that expenses reasonably incurred in mitigating the loss are recoverable. 
Thus, A, whose frequently used private car is stolen by B, may hire a substitute car and 
recover the cost of hire. This approximates an award of user damages.  135  In a sense, A’s 
non-pecuniary loss (loss of use) is converted into a pecuniary loss (cost of hiring the 
substitute).  136  The advantage of mitigating the loss in this manner is obvious considering 
that damages may be assessed at a lesser sum where no substitute has been hired.  137  
The question, then, is whether A is always entitled to strengthen his or her claim by 
hiring a substitute. This would depend on whether hiring a substitute car has any 
mitigating effect, which must in turn depend on the purpose for which A owned the car 
that was stolen by B. Two House of Lords decisions suggest that hiring a substitute car 
would be unreasonable if A has no use for it, for example if he or she was in hospital 
or abroad for a holiday.  138  By the same reasoning, where A imports used cars for direct 
resale or to be dismantled for spare parts, hiring a substitute car does not in any way 
mitigate his or her loss. Thus, the proper identifi cation of A’s loss affects not only the 
kind of evidence that is required to sustain the claim but also dictates what A is entitled 
to do to mitigate his or her loss. 
 130 .  [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Ch), 815–16. 
 131 .  [2009] UKPC 45; [2011] 1 WLR 2370, [54] (Lord Walker). 
 132 .  [1975] Ch 408 (Ch), 419–420. 
 133 .  [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA), 282. 
 134 .  See [2017] Conv 339, 347–349. 
 135 .  See  Aitken Agencies Ltd v Richardson [1967] NZLR 65 (NZHC), 67, where McGregor J referred to 
 Strand Electric to justify the plaintiff’s recovery of the cost of hiring a substitute vehicle. See also  Davis v Oswell 
(1837) 7 C & P 804 (Assizes). 
 136 .  Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067, [27] (Lord Nicholls). 
 137 .  See  supra , fn.51. 
 138 .  Lagden v O’Connor [2003] UKHL 64; [2004] 1 AC 1067, [27] (Lord Nicholls);  Giles v Thompson 
[1994] 1 AC 142 (HL), 167 (Lord Mustill). 
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 VII. CONCLUSION 
 The contest between compensatory and restitutionary proponents of user damages is 
sometimes pitched at a practical level. On one view, a restitutionary analysis is redundant 
because A will not be able to recover more by phrasing his or her claim in restitutionary 
terms.  139  Take, for example, the case of the misappropriated car. B’s gain is assessed by 
reference to the expenses saved in not having to pay for the use of a car, which is usually 
represented by the market price for hiring a similar car.  140  The assertion that A could 
recover as much by pursuing a compensatory claim necessarily assumes that the same 
measure is employed in the assessment of A’s loss. The prior discussion shows that this 
is not always true. For property torts, the measure of A’s loss would depend on a number 
of factors, including the purpose for which the property is owned, whether a substitute 
has been obtained, whether prompt action was taken to recover the property, and so on. In 
certain cases, the courts may adopt a different measure of A’s loss, which may result in the 
recovery of a lesser sum. 
 On the other hand, the reach of a compensatory analysis has occasionally been 
underestimated. While this does not usually matter, for A may choose to pursue a 
restitutionary claim instead, the risk of under-compensation becomes real where A’s 
restitutionary claim is limited by B’s successful invocation of a restitutionary defence. 
While the existing authorities do not support the view that substantial compensatory 
damages are generally available, a careful examination of a number of important 
cases suggests the reach of a compensatory reasoning is not weak either. In particular, 
by invoking the  Strand Electric argument, a great number of cases on this topic are 
explicable as concerning loss of profi ts, specifi cally the loss of an opportunity to charge 
B a fee. Also, if one agrees with the analysis of  Wrotham Park damages proposed in this 
article, an additional string may be added to A’s compensation bow, provided of course 
that the pre-conditions are satisfi ed. 
 Both over- and under-statement of the limits of compensatory damages, I suggest, could 
be attributed in part to the frequent use of broad labels. They are often used in the widest 
sense to capture all monetary awards that are analogous in form but not necessarily in 
substance. This over-generalises the cases and conceals important differences that have 
implications on issues of proof, quantifi cation and mitigation. If we can agree that broad 
labels add nothing but distraction and confusion, perhaps we ought to consider dropping 
them from our legal vocabulary. 
 139 .  See eg  Bunnings Group Ltd v CHEP Australia Ltd (2011) 82 NSWLR 420 (NSW CA), [174],  per Allsop 
P: “Rules of compensatory damages, sensibly and fl exibly applied, are adequate to explain the theoretical and 
practical positions, without any extension of principle involving the award of the wrongdoer’s profi t as a remedial 
consequence of the commission of a tort”. See also Low (2016) 28 SAcLJ 984. 
 140 .  Penarth Dock Engineering Co Ltd v Pounds  [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 359 (CA), 362, (Denning LJ); 
 Lewisham LBC v Masterson (2000) 80 P & CR 117 (CA), 123 (Buxton LJ). 
